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There is a distinct difference in the way that different theories about the origin
of AIDS have been treated, with the widely supported cut-hunter theory given
relatively little scrutiny while the oral-polio-vaccine theory has been subject to
intense criticism. This difference in treatment cannot be explained as
application of the scientific method. A better explanation is that the burden of
proof is put on all contenders to the cut-hunter theory, giving it an unfair
advantage, especially given that this assignment of the burden of proof appears
to reflect nonscientific factors.

1. Origin of AIDS stories
Since the first cases of AIDS were diagnosed in 1981, the disease has killed millions of
people, so it is natural to ask how it originated. Aside from intellectual curiosity,
understanding of the origin may help in developing means of curing or preventing AIDS or
in preventing the outbreak of similar diseases.
The most commonly supported origin story is the transfer of simian immunodeficiency
viruses (SIVs) from nonhuman primates to humans, where they becomes HIVs, by any of
several methods, such as a hunter butchering a monkey and getting blood from it into a cut,
a monkey biting a human or a person eating undercooked monkey meat. This transfer is
then thought to have led to the AIDS pandemic through human-to-human transfer. This
will be called here the cut-hunter theory - a metonym for direct nonhuman-primate-to-
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human transfer followed by human-to-human amplification - since the more usual
expression ‘natural transfer’ suffers from semantic confusion due to multiple meanings of
‘natural’, furthermore, human social processes are integral to the theory.
There have been numerous competing theories for the origin of AIDS, including for
example that a biological warfare experiment went wrong and that factors other than HIV
are responsible for AIDS (Lederer 1987/1988). For the purpose of analysing the scientific
reception to competing theories, the focus here is on one particular alternative: that mass
vaccination campaigns in Africa in the late 1950s, using an oral polio vaccine (OPV), were
responsible for the AIDS pandemic (Cribb 1996; Curtis 1992; Elswood & Stricker 1994;
Goldberg & Stricker 2000; Hooper 2000; Lecatsas & Alexander 1989; Pascal 1991).
The argument for the OPV theory goes like this: OPVs were cultured on monkey kidneys
and thus could have been contaminated by SIVs; monkeys with SIVs do not necessarily
show any sign of ill health and so may not have been rejected as sources of kidney tissue;
the vaccine was not tested for SIVs, which were not discovered until 1985; OPVs were given
to around one million people in central and west Africa in the period 1957-1960; the earliest
known AIDS cases and HIV+ blood samples are strikingly correlated with the time and
location of the African immunisation campaigns; many young children, whose immune
systems are undeveloped, were given the vaccine in an extra high dose. In addition, vaccine
transmission of monkey viruses to humans is known to be possible because OPVs
contaminated by the monkey virus SV-40 were given to millions of people (Shah &
Nathanson 1976). This theory first received widespread attention in 1992 and was given
renewed attention on publication of Edward Hooper’s book The River (2000).
In a number of publications (e.g., Basilico et al. 1992; Hahn et al. 2000; Koprowski 1992;
Korber et al. 2000), the OPV theory has come under close and critical scrutiny. However,
there appears to be no equivalent examination of the cut-hunter theory. The aim of this
paper is to explore this difference in treatment. Section 2 gives a brief overview of ideas
about methods and rhetoric in scientific proof. Section 3 analyses the burden of proof in
two characteristic publications, and the concluding section spells out some implications.

2. Methods and rhetoric in scientific proof
Over the past several decades, historians, philosophers and sociologists have learned a lot
about the process of doing science, with insights that often conflict with the perceptions of
practitioners and the general public (Barnes 1974; Chalmers 1976; Collins & Pinch 1998;
Hess 1997; Ravetz 1971). Scientists often explain what they do as an exercise in applying the
‘scientific method,’ but many scholars who have examined the practice of scientific research
conclude that the method is more rhetoric than reality (Barnes 1974; Bauer 1992;
Feyerabend 1975). Scientific research is a complex activity that cannot readily be boiled
down to a set of rules; practices vary depending on the discipline, the research topic and
often the scientist. Formal rules can account for only a component of scientific behaviour,
since much that occurs is unspoken and indeed unconceptualised (Polanyi 1966).
In much research, scientists seek evidence to confirm their hunches, yet philosophers have
long demonstrated that confirmations do not prove a theory, since there may exist evidence
that conflicts with it. An opposite approach, championed by Karl Popper (1963), is to seek
evidence that conflicts with hypotheses. Popperian falsificationism is often invoked by
scientists to explain what they are doing, even when it is not an accurate reflection of what
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they are actually doing (Gilbert & Mulkay 1982; Mulkay & Gilbert 1982). One of the
problems with falsificationism is that there is no definitive evidence. Conflicting evidence
can be explained away as faulty experimentation or interpretation, like dismissal of the
careful 1930s experiments that showed aether drift, apparently falsifying special relativity.
If the conflicting evidence is hard to dismiss, a theory can be maintained by introducing
subsidiary hypotheses, rather like Ptolemaic epicycles used to prop up the theory that the
sun revolves around the earth. Then there is the case of uniformitarian geology and
evolutionary biology in the second half of the nineteenth century. Leading physicist Lord
Kelvin calculated the age of the earth to be far less than geologists and biologists had been
assuming, leading most of them to adapt their theories to Kelvin’s shorter figure. The later
discovery of radioactivity led to a vast increase in the accepted age of the earth (Burchfield
1975).
Not only can evidence be discounted, explained away or superseded by new discoveries, but
it is never independent of theory (Hesse 1974). A fact can only be understood through the
lens of a theoretical framework. This means that competing frameworks may interpret facts
in different ways. The classic account of competing frameworks is Thomas Kuhn’s (1970)
study of paradigms, normal science and revolutions in science. While the concept of
paradigms has been debated and modified (e.g. Barnes 1982), the idea that facts are theoryladen is standard in social studies of science.
Another factor affecting scientific research is the intense commitment of scientists,
especially leading scientists, to their ideas (Mahoney 1976; Mitroff 1974; Watson 1938).
Scientists are likely to defend their pet theories against criticisms and new evidence, finding
ways of preserving their preferred options in the face of tremendous challenges. This can
actually be functional for science (Mitroff 1974), in that promising options are not discarded
too easily but rather kept alive by their diehard adherents. There are examples, such as
continental drift, where a few lone partisans held out against orthodoxy and whose ideas
later became orthodoxy.
Given that facts are in part dependent on theories, that unwelcome facts can be challenged
or dismissed, that theories can be maintained despite disconfirming evidence, and that
many scientists are highly committed to their preferred theories, there is an abundance of
evidential, conceptual and psychological resources for waging scientific disputes, not to
mention material resources including laboratories, salaries and publishers. Scientists can
‘push’ their arguments by their choice of technical assumptions, through selective use of
evidence and results, by their way of referring to alternative arguments and through their
treatment of uncertainties (Martin 1979). The implication is that choices between scientific
theories are not ‘scientific’ in the sense of being purely logical choices made by neutral
researchers based on unambiguous evidence and clear criteria. While it may be a goal to
move towards such a model, in practice things are much messier epistemologically and
pragmatically.
One of the advantages of better understanding the dynamics of scientific knowledge
creation is the possibility of throwing light on ongoing scientific disputes. Rather than
operating with an idealised picture of scientific practice, the complexities and biases can be
acknowledged and used to help achieve the goals of science which, arguably, should include
both better knowledge and benefit to humans (Horrobin 1990; Maxwell 1984).

3. The burden of proof in origin of AIDS theories
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When two or more theories are in competition, it is common for one of them to be treated
as the established position - the default option, as it were - and the others to be treated as
challengers. A challenging theory is normally expected to bear the burden or onus of proof.
In other words, advocates of the challenging theory are expected to provide highly
convincing evidence and arguments before the theory can be taken seriously. To use a
different metaphor, it is assumed that the established theory has jumped over a very high
hurdle to gain its leading position and that any challenger must jump over an equally high
hurdle before being in contention for the remainder of the race.
While this sounds reasonable, the problem in practice is that scientific criteria alone are
inadequate for deciding whether a theory should or should not bear the burden of proof. In
many cases, a theory becomes the established position through chance or social factors,
such as evidence for it being discovered earlier or its advocates having easier access to
publication. Furthermore, when two theories are in competition, there are no unambiguous
criteria for deciding when the burden of proof should switch from one to the other. Hence,
making an assumption about the burden of proof can be a means by which scientists ‘push’
their arguments and thereby promote their favoured theory (Martin 1979).
These abstract considerations have an immediate and direct application to theories about
the origin of AIDS. Nearly all commentators have assumed that cut-hunter transfer is the
default option, with the burden of proof carried by any challenger. Yet the cut-hunter theory
never went through any significant scrutiny in order to gain its leading position: no ‘hard
evidence’ has ever been produced to show a hunter was exposed to SIV leading to
transmissible AIDS. It might be said that advocates of the cut-hunter theory snuck under
the initial high hurdle but are demanding that all other contenders jump over it. Whatever
the process, assumptions about the burden of proof have a major impact on comparative
assessment of scientific theories. To illustrate this, two publications are examined here: the
Wistar Committee report (Basilico et al. 1992) and a recent paper by Hahn et al. (2000).

3.1 The Wistar Committee report
The Wistar Institute in Philadelphia produced the polio vaccines that, according to the OPV
theory, may have been responsible for triggering the AIDS pandemic. Following publication
of an article about the theory by Tom Curtis (1992) and subsequent publicity, the Wistar
Institute set up a committee - the AIDS/Poliovirus Advisory Committee - to examine the
theory. The committee produced a short report in September that year (Basilico et al. 1992).
That this report is based on the assumption that the OPV theory bears the onus of proof can
be illustrated by three features.
1. The report examines the OPV theory but does not examine the cut-hunter theory. If the
burden of proof had been equally shared, then equal critical attention should have been
devoted to the cut-hunter theory.
2. The report concludes that the OPV theory is ‘extremely unlikely’ to be correct by using an
a priori analysis of probabilities, but does not apply this method to the cut-hunter theory.
The authors seek to determine the probability that the OPV theory is correct by ‘assessing
the probability that each step in this postulated mode of transmission would have occurred
successfully to allow HIV or a close progenitor to enter the human population during the
Congo poliovirus vaccine trials’ (p. 1). The principal steps they consider are contamination
of the vaccine by SIV, transmission of SIV/HIV by the oral route, and mutation of any
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known monkey SIV to HIV-1 in the time between the vaccination campaigns and the
earliest samples of HIV-1. They assess the probability of each step as low and hence the
probability of the concatenation of steps as extremely low. This approach is internally
logical but the conclusion drawn about the probability of the OPV theory requires an
additional, unstated assumption, namely that the probability of cut-hunter transfer is
significantly higher.
If the same approach of assessing the probabilities of steps in a chain of transmission is
applied to cut-hunter transfer, then some principal steps to consider are that the transfer
occurred in the precise geographical region from which the AIDS pandemic appears to have
originated, that the transfer occurred just before the earliest known HIV+ samples and
cases of AIDS, and that an additional transfer occurred (for HIV-2) at roughly the same
time. If, for the sake of argument, it is assumed that monkeys with SIVs have been
butchered for one hundred thousand years, then the chance that SIV would cause a
pandemic precisely in the past century is, a priori, one in a thousand (setting aside
considerations such as rates of butchering and riskiness of butchering techniques). The
chance that two independent SIV transfers to humans causing a pandemic or epidemic
would occur within the same century then becomes one in a million. This figure does not yet
include the factor of geographical distribution nor additional independent SIV transfers. (A
more realistic period for human-primate predation is 1 or 2 million years, but the presence
of SIVs over this period is speculative.)
Of course, such a calculation applied to the cut-hunter theory is unfair, because we know
now that AIDS first occurred in the past century. An a priori probability calculation is not
sensible, since it is possible to work backwards and say that the SIV transmissions must
have happened just at the times that would lead to the present manifestations of disease.
However, if this sort of post hoc analysis is applied to cut-hunter transfer, then it should
also be applied to competing theories. If two routes of transmission each have a one in a
million chance of occurring, neither is likely. But if these are the only two possible routes
and it is known that transmission did occur, then logically they should be considered to be
equally likely.
The Wistar Committee thus dismisses the OPV theory by loading it with an enormous
burden of proof, namely the requirement that it be probable a priori, while applying no
such burden to cut-hunter transfer, implicitly assumed to be the default theory.
3. The Committee uses a single contrary piece of evidence as a definitive refutation of the
OPV theory.
The Committee stated: ‘The most telling evidence is the case of the Manchester sailor who
appears to have been infected with HIV-1 even before the poliovirus trials were begun in
Congo’ (p. 6). The sailor, David Carr, died in 1959 of AIDS-like symptoms first displayed in
1958. His tissues were later found to contain HIV (Corbitt, Bailey & Williams 1990).
As noted in section 2, any theory can be rescued in the face of contrary evidence by rejecting
or dismissing the evidence or by introducing subsidiary hypotheses, namely by suitably
modifying the theory. In 1992, there were several ways that the evidence of the Manchester
sailor evidence could have been explained away while still maintaining the OPV theory. The
earliest mass uses of OPV vaccine in Africa were in 1957, and David Carr could have had sex
with a vaccinee during his naval career and rapidly developed AIDS. Alternatively, he might
have been given a contaminated polio vaccine in one of the early experimental trials in
Britain. Finally, the HIV detected in his issues might have been a contamination.
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That the detection of HIV in David Carr’s tissues was later refuted (Zhu & Ho 1995) is not
the main point here since, even without that finding, the OPV theory could have been
maintained using any of various explanations for the finding, or by just ignoring the
evidence for the time being, as is common practice in many scientific disputes. The key
point here is that the Wistar Committee did not make any attempt to explain away the
Manchester sailor evidence, something that can be interpreted as reflecting its assignment
of the burden of proof to the OPV theory.

In summary, the entire argument of Wistar Committee report is shaped by its authors’
assumption that the OPV theory bears the onus of proof. There is a striking asymmetry in
the way that competing theories are examined: only one theory is scrutinised; the theory is
subjected to an a priori probability analysis that is extremely difficult to overcome; and no
attempt is made to find ways around a ‘telling’ piece of evidence. If the OPV theory had
been the established one and the same sort of approach applied to its challengers, the cuthunter theory could have been dismissed equally easily.

3.2 Hahn et al.
Hahn et al.’s (2000) paper ‘AIDS as a zoonosis’ is an analysis of transmissions of SIVs to
humans, with discussions of the genetic characterisation of SIVs, the origins of HIVs and
implications for science and public health. It assesses two AIDS origin hypotheses: cuthunter transfer and OPV. The onus of proof is put on the OPV theory, as shown by the
following points.
1. Hahn et al. expect ‘direct evidence’ to support the OPV theory but not the cut-hunter
theory.
Hahn et al. say that the OPV theory relies ‘on the supposition that chimpanzee and sooty
mangabey kidneys were used in vaccine preparation, although there is no direct evidence to
support this contention’ (p. 612). They do not mention any of the circumstantial evidence
for use of chimpanzee kidneys presented by Hooper (2000). On the other hand, they do not
present any direct evidence for cut-hunter transfer nor even say whether it would even be
possible to obtain direct evidence. Thus the OPV theory is held to a higher standard than
the cut-hunter theory.
2. Hahn et al. use an estimate of the date of HIV-1’s origin apparently calculated assuming
cut-hunter transfer as an argument against the OPV theory.
They say ‘the M group of HIV-1 has been estimated to have originated 10 to 50 years before
the OPV vaccine trials were conducted’ (p. 612). This dating apparently assumes a single
initial simian-human transfer, consistent with cut-hunter transfer. However, OPV transfer
could have involved dozens or hundreds of near-simultaneous transfers, significantly
changing the dating of the origin of the M group. Hahn et al. put the burden of proof on the
OPV theory by expecting it to meet challenges established assuming the correctness of the
cut-hunter theory.
3. Hahn et al. use arguments from a single discipline to reject the OPV theory, which is a
multidisciplinary option, but do not reject the cut-hunter theory using arguments from a
discipline other than their own.
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Hahn et al. argue that the subtypes of HIV-1 group M are unlikely to have resulted from
different chimpanzee SIVs injected into humans via polio vaccines, due to the genetic
equidistance of the observed subtypes. Setting aside a technical response to this argument,
it can be noted that it assumes rejection of the OPV theory is possible simply through
genetic arguments. The extensive epidemiological evidence for the OPV theory (Hooper
2000) is not addressed.
In contrast, Hahn et al. support the cut-hunter theory with detailed genetic arguments but a
superficial treatment of historical and social factors that must be invoked to explain why, if
AIDS originated early in the 1900s, it did not spread more widely much sooner than
observed. Furthermore, they do not address the arguments drawn from African history that
suggest the implausibility of AIDS being restricted to a few villages for decades before
spreading more widely (Cribb 1996; Hooper 2000). This asymmetrical treatment of the two
theories can be explained by Hahn et al.’s assumption that the burden of proof lies with the
OPV theory. This means that the OPV theory must meet every objection from every
discipline - in particular Hahn et al.’s own genetic arguments - whereas the cut-hunter
theory need not meet objections from disciplines outside the authors’ fields of expertise.

Like the Wistar Committee report, Hahn et al.’s (2000) arguments are shaped by their
assumption that the OPV theory bears the burden of proof. This leads to a striking
asymmetry in treatment of the two competing theories. ‘Direct evidence’ is expected of the
OPV theory but not of the cut-hunter theory; a calculation of the date of origin apparently
relies on the assumption of cut-hunter transfer; and arguments from a single discipline
(genetics) are used to reject the OPV theory but arguments from a single discipline (social
history) are not used to rebut the cut-hunter theory. If the positions of the two theories were
reversed, it would be equally easy to reject cut-hunter transfer.

4. Conclusion
The OPV theory for the origin of AIDS has been subject to close critical scrutiny and, it
should be said, this is quite appropriate in science. On the other hand, the competing cuthunter theory has not been subjected a similar scrutiny, but rather treated as the default
option. Relatively few attempts seem to have been made to confirm cut-hunter transfer
empirically, for example by finding pre-1950s HIV+ blood samples, nor to falsify it. This can
be explained by proposing that scientists supportive of the cut-hunter theory have been
successful in placing the burden of proof on challengers. Interestingly, though, there has
been little urgency in seeking to confirm or falsify the OPV theory by testing samples of
early polio vaccines. Calls to test samples held by the Wistar Institute were first made in the
early 1990s but apparently were not heeded until 2000.
Since the OPV theory was proposed, several developments have occurred in its favour,
including refutation of the evidence that the Manchester sailor had AIDS (Zhu & Ho 1995),
the uncovering of suggestive evidence about the use of chimpanzee kidneys to make polio
vaccines (Hooper 2000) and collection of epidemiological evidence concerning the earliest
known cases of AIDS and HIV+ blood samples (Hooper 2000). No equivalent
developments have bolstered the case for the cut-hunter theory, for which direct evidence
seems virtually impossible to obtain. Therefore, it can be argued, it would be appropriate to
reverse the onus of proof or at least to subject the cut-hunter theory to scrutiny equivalent
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to that given to the OPV theory.
The question arises, why has the OPV theory been expected to carry such an enormous and
continuing burden of proof? One answer is that the theory is quite threatening to members
of the scientific and medical establishment because it stigmatises medicine for causing
AIDS and reduces public trust in vaccinations (Martin 1993, 1998). Evidence compatible
with this explanation for the treatment of the theory includes legal threats and actions
against authors and publishers of the theory (Curtis 1995), repeated rejection of
submissions (Martin 1993, 1998) and statements by critics that the theory would be
detrimental to current vaccination efforts (e.g., Hooper 2000, pp. 436, 783; Vaughan 2000,
p. 240) or cause distrust in science (Moore 1999). Proponents of the theory have presented
various reasons why it should be treated more seriously, including gaining insights for
opposing AIDS and alerting people to the dangers of new iatrogenic diseases, for example
through xenotransplantation.
Like many other scientific controversies, the debate over the origin of AIDS contains a
mixture of scientific and social assumptions and argumentation. Trying to separate the
scientific and the social may seem attractive but has the danger that social factors may
simply be buried in what seem to be scientific matters, of which the burden of proof is a
distinctive example. An alternative is to be more open about all the assumptions being
made, and to accept a wide range of interested parties, both scientists and nonscientists, as
legitimate participants in the debate.
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